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ABSTRACT
The project of this paper is to deliver a semantics for a broad subset of 
bare plural generics about racial kinds, a class which I will dub ‘Type 
C generics.’ Examples include ‘Blacks are criminal’ and ‘Muslims are 
terrorists.’ Type C generics have two interesting features. First, they 
link racial kinds with socially perspectival predicates (SPPs). SPPs lead 
interpreters to treat the relationship between kinds and predicates 
in generic constructions as nomic or non-accidental. Moreover, in 
computing their content, interpreters must make implicit reference 
to socially privileged perspectives which are treated as authoritative 
about whether a given object fits into the extension of the predicate. 
Such deference grants these authorities influence over both the 
conventional meaning of these terms and over the nature of the 
objects in the social ontology that these terms purport to describe, 
much the way a baseball umpire is authoritative over the meaning 
and metaphysics of ‘strike’/strike. Second, terms like ‘criminal’ and 
‘terrorist’ receive default racialized interpretations in which these 
terms conventionally token racial or ethnic identities. I show that 
neither of these features can be explained by Sarah-Jane Leslie’s 
influential ‘weak semantics’ for generics, and show how my own 
‘socially perspectival semantics’ fares better on both counts. Finally, 
I give an analysis of ‘Blacks are criminal’ which explores the semantic 
mechanisms that underlie default racialized interpretations.
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Generics are generalizations about kinds such as:
(1) Tigers are striped.
(2) Birds fly.
(3) Mosquitoes carry the West nile Virus.
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Despite their ostensible innocence, the problem of determining 
the truth conditions of generics has bedeviled semanticists for over 
40 years. Part of the problem is that generics are not susceptible 
to any uniform quantificational analysis. For instance, despite the 
fact that (1)–(3) are each intuitively true and have the same surface 
structure, each sentence is true under different quantificational 
conditions. Sentence (1) seems to express something like all tigers 
are striped and thus requires a universal quantifier. On the other 
hand, (3) seems to be existentially quantified – it is true if there are 
at least some mosquitoes which carry West Nile. Finally, sentence 
(2) seems in need of a quantifier like ‘most.’ After all, most birds 
do fly, but penguins, ostriches, and over 40 other species of bird 
do not.
In fact, generic statements do not behave like kind-wide quanti-
fications at all. For one thing, even paradigmatic ‘majority generics’ 
like (1) are not equivalent to any universally quantified sentence:
(1) Tigers are striped.
(1a) All tigers are striped.
Notably, (1), but not (1a), is compatible with the existence of non-
striped tigers. Other, more tricky generics abound:
(4) Ducks lay eggs.
(5) Ducks are female.
(6) Books are paperbacks.
Intuitively, (4) is true, and (5) is false. Why? After all, there are more 
female ducks than there are egg-laying ducks, since roughly half of 
ducks are female and a subset of that are unable or too immature 
to reproduce. (6) is intuitively false, despite the fact that 80% of 
all books are paperbacks. Thus, the sheer prevalence of a property 
F among a kind K does not seem to be evidence for the truth of a 
generic of the form K’s are F.
One reason for this puzzle is that unlike quantifiers, generics 
express relationships between properties and kinds, not between 
properties and individuals. How many individual K’s are F is fre-
quently irrelevant to the truth-conditions of ‘K’s are F.’ Generics also 
express special kinds of relationships between kinds and proper-
ties (Prasada and Dillingham 2006). They do not simply imply a 
statistical, accidental, or chance correlation between a kind and 
a property; rather, they imply – and are commonly interpreted as 
implying – a nomic, causal connection between the two. ‘Ravens 
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are black’ does not mean that it just so happens that ravens tend 
to correlate with blackness at a rate of virtually 100%, but that 
something in the biological endowment of ravens makes it the 
case that they are black (and that the non-black ones represent 
mutations.) The same applies to weaker generalizations that do not 
invoke biological essences. Consider ‘college students drink beer.’ 
College students as a kind do not only drink beer at a statistically 
high rate, but there is something in the way that college life is 
set up (social camaraderie/pressure, access to alcohol, etc.) that 
suggests the presence of a causal connection between collegiate 
status and beer consumption. Generics thus express something 
over and above what is expressed by the kind-wide quantifications 
that are their cousins. ‘100% of/All ravens are black,’ and ‘80% of/
most college students drink beer’ certainly imply strong relation-
ships between ravens and blackness and college students and 
beer consumption, but they stop short of implying that this cor-
relation is nomic or non-accidental.
Given their truth-conditional slipperiness, I am not optimis-
tic that a semantics which accounts for all generics is possible.1 
Consequently, in this paper, I will not be exploring the seman-
tics of generics tout court, but in pointing out some interest-
ing features of a special class of generics that I will dub ‘Type C 
Generics.’ With a few notable exceptions (McConnell-Ginet 2003; 
Haslanger 2011, 2012, Leslie forthcoming), the generics litera-
ture has largely avoided this interesting and problematic class. 
Examples include:
1This is not to say that ingenious and heroic global analyses have not been proposed. The three 
dominant approaches have been normality and/or possible worlds approaches (Asher and 
Morreau 1995; nickel 2009), stereotype theories (Geurts 1985; Declerck 1986), and proba-
bilistic approaches (Cohen 1999). roughly speaking, normality approaches attempt to cash 
out the truth-conditions of generics in terms of some notion of normalcy. For instance, a 
generic statement ‘As are F’ might be interpreted as saying that normal As have property F, 
or that A’s do or would have property F in some set of normal possible worlds. Stereotype 
theories hold that ‘As are F’ is true iff it is the case that the stereotypical A has property F. 
Probabilistic approaches associate the generic truth-conditions of ‘A’s are F’ with ‘comparative 
probabilities’ which specify (1) the probability of an arbitrary x in A having property F or (2) 
the probability of an arbitrary x in A having property F as opposed to the probability of an 
arbitrary y in a superset of A having property F. Either strategy is employed depending on 
what the intuitive truth conditions of the generic statement are.
Each of these theories admits of intuitive counterexamples, and each makes at least some 
false empirical predictions. There is a lively literature which tries to address these a priori 
and empirical data points. See especially Carlson and Pelletier 1995.
4   P. O’DONNELL
(7) Blacks2 are criminal.
(8) Muslims are terrorists.
(9) Blacks are thuggish.
The project of this paper is to deliver a systematic treatment for 
these generics. The first goal will be to demonstrate that sentences 
like (7)–(9) comprise an interesting linguistic type. In so doing, I will 
discuss Leslie’s (2007, 2008) influential ‘weak semantics’ for gener-
ics, and show that it does not account for the interesting features 
that this type has. Briefly, those interesting features are as follows. 
First, Type C generics link social kinds with special lexical items 
which I will call socially perspectival predicates (SPPs). Roughly, 
SPPs are special because they require interpreters to make refer-
ence to socially privileged perspectives which are authoritative 
about whether a given object fits into the extension of a given 
SPP. This capability is deserving of a special semantic treatment 
which Leslie’s semantics does not offer. In particular, I argue that 
SPPs contain in their semantics a contextual parameter that is 
filled by a socially privileged relevant perspective (RP.) SPPs (and a 
fortiori, Type C generics) thus require what I will call a perspectival 
semantics.
Second, sentences like (7)–(9) trigger specific interpretations of 
the predicates attributed to them. These interpretations of SPPs 
like ‘criminal,’ ‘thuggish,’ and ‘terrorist’ are racialized – they link crim-
inality, thuggishness, and terrorist activity to racial and ethnic iden-
tities, and imply that this link is nomic or non-accidental. In the final 
section of the paper, I give a perspectival semantics for ‘criminal’ 
which shows how these terms can be indexed to particular racial 
identities in interpretation.
1. Leslie’s weak semantics: type A and type B generics
In her groundbreaking work on generics, Sarah-Jane Leslie has 
argued that the capacity to understand and interpret generics 
is a byproduct of a primitive generalization mechanism which is 
involved in early conceptual categorization and inductive reason-
ing. If Leslie is indeed correct that generics are indirect linguistic 
2Throughout the paper I capitalize terms for races, as in ‘White’ and ‘Black.’ This is to distinguish 
race terms from color terms (‘black’ and ‘white’), and also to draw attention to the fact that I 
am thinking of racial membership in terms of belonging to a certain social role, not only in 
terms of having a certain skin color.
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evidence for the existence and function of such a mechanism, we 
ought to expect children’s competence with generics to manifest 
itself fairly early in cognitive development.
A variety of empirical data lend prima facie support to Leslie’s 
hypothesis. As early as 3 years old, children display adult-like com-
petence with recognizing, interpreting, and reasoning with generic 
language (Gelman 2003). For instance, they seem to be sensitive 
to the ways in which the truth-conditions of generics depend on 
the precise nature of the property being attributed to the kind. 
Preschoolers will accept claims such as ‘lions have manes’ while 
rejecting claims such as ‘lions are boys,’ ‘despite implicitly under-
standing that there are at least as many “boy” lions as there are 
maned lions.’ (Brandone et al. 2012; Leslie 2014.)
On the other hand, preschoolers are far less competent when 
it comes to sentences involving quantifiers. Full competence with 
quantifying words such as ‘all,’ ‘most,’ and ‘some’ arises compara-
tively late in development (Gelman 2003; Halberda and Feigenson 
2008) If we assume that computing more complex truth conditions 
involves more complex computations, this is a fairly surprising 
result. After all, the semantic profile of quantifiers seems to be far 
simpler and more uniform than the semantic profile of generics. 
Intuitively, ‘All ravens are black’ is satisfied just in case every raven 
in a given domain is black, ‘most’ is satisfied just in case more than 
half of all ravens are black, ‘some’ is satisfied just in case at least one 
raven is black, etc., whereas most semantic theories hold that the 
truth conditions of generics are rather complex. Surely we should 
expect comprehension of generics to piggyback on comprehen-
sion of quantifiers! Not only is this not the case, but it turns out that 
both children and adults recall quantified sentences as generics, 
suggesting that generics are both more cognitively fundamental 
and more easily interpreted than quantified sentences (Leslie and 
Gelman 2012.)
Despite the unruly semantic behavior of generics, adults and 
children seem to be in possession of a procedure for computing 
their truth-conditions, even when it comes to aforementioned 
‘tricky’ generics like ‘ducks lay eggs’ or ‘mosquitoes carry West 
Nile.’ Leslie divides these tricky generics into two types, Type A 
and Type B.
6   P. O’DONNELL
Roughly, generics of Type A are intuitively true in virtue of (a) 
predicating properties which belong to a certain characteris-
tic dimension for the kind and (b) predicating properties whose 
counter-instances are negative rather than positive. Plausible can-
didates for ‘characteristic dimensions’ include body morphology, 
reproduction, vocalization (in the case of animal kinds), as well as 
functional roles and perhaps cultural norms in the case of con-
ventional or social kinds. The distinction between positive and 
negative counter-instances ultimately amounts to a difference in 
psychological salience:
A positive counterinstance to Ks are F occurs when an instance of the 
kind K has a concrete alternative property, that is, when it has a pos-
itive alternative to the property F, while negative counter-instances 
occur when an instance simply fails to be F. Whether a counterin-
stance counts as positive or negative is highly dependent on the 
property being predicated. (Leslie 2007: 66)
If a generic predicates a property with salient positive counter-in-
stances, then the generic is likely to be judged false. If the coun-
ter-instances to the property predicated are negative, then the 
generic is likely to be judged true. For instance, there is a positive 
alternative to being female; one could be male. On the other hand, 
it is not clear that there is any positive alternative to laying eggs, at 
least for ducks. Thus, ‘ducks lay eggs’ is judged true because laying 
eggs lies along a characteristic reproduction dimension for ducks, 
and there are no positive counter-instances. Conversely, ‘ducks are 
female’ is judged false because there is a positive alternative prop-
erty to being female.3
Generics of Type B, on the other hand, are intuitively true in 
virtue of ascribing ‘striking properties’ to kinds. Striking properties 
are harmful, frightening, or dangerous properties which we would 
be wise to avoid. Examples include ‘Mosquitoes carry West Nile’ 
and ‘sharks attack swimmers.’ These generics are frequently judged 
to be true even when the objective prevalence of the property 
among the kind is very low, since the cognitive cost of treating 
these generics as true is far lower than the possible risk of treat-
ing them as false. Consequently, people tend to overestimate the 
prevalence of a striking property among a relevant kind, and these 
3However, see Sterken (2015) for counterexamples to and arguments against the claim that 
all true Type A generics have negative counter-instances.
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sentences tend to receive a weighted role in inference (Khemlani, 
Leslie, and Glucksberg 2009). Moreover, the knee-jerk overgener-
alizations which Type B generics prompt seem to play a role in the 
formation of prejudices and stereotypes about social kinds (Leslie 
forthcoming; Rhodes, Leslie, and Tworek 2012).
Leslie takes the behavior of Type A and Type B generics to be 
strong evidence for two claims. First, our facility with these types 
shows that generics express ‘cognitively fundamental generali-
zations’ about kinds. The seemingly disordered character of our 
semantic intuitions about tricky generics shows that this funda-
mental generalization mechanism is rife with biases which affect 
the space of kinds and properties over which we generalize. 
Second, the semantics of the GEN4 operator must be relatively sim-
ple, since even young children can grasp the semantic contribution 
made by the generic operator, even though it can be attached to all 
sorts of different sentences. A uniform metalanguage interpreta-
tion of GEN thus cannot account for the truth-conditional diversity 
that Type A and Type B generics display. Accordingly, Leslie opts to 
simply disquote GEN in the semantics, offering no interpretation 
of GEN in the metalanguage:
‘Tigers are striped’ is true iff [GEN] Tigers are striped.
In order to account for the behavior of Type A and Type B gener-
ics, Leslie (2007, 2008) offers a ‘weak semantics’ which specifies the 
set of conditions which any generic sentence must meet if it is to 
be judged true:
A generic K’s are F is true iff:
4According to the dominant trend in semantics, the logical form of generic sentences is very 
close to the logical form of sentences which include adverbs of quantification such as ‘usually,’ 
‘generally,’ etc. (Lewis 1975; Krifka et al. 1995; Leslie 2007.) In particular, sentences of this 
sort have a tripartite structure which includes a variable-binding Operator of some sort, a 
restrictor, and a Matrix:
Operatorx , … , z [Restrictorx … z] [Matrixx … z]
The restrictor specifies the objects to which bound variables are assigned. The Matrix speci-
fies the property or properties which are assigned to the objects in the restrictor. The job of 
the Operator is to bind the variables in the restrictor and Matrix and to relate them to one 
another. In the case of sentences like ‘All ravens are black’ or ‘Some students are responsible,’ 
the Operator will be a universal or existential quantifier. In the case of generics, the Operator 
will be a variable-binding Operator GEn. Bracketing the question of what the semantic 
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(1)   The counter-instances to the claim are negative. That is, 
there is no noteworthy or salient property G such that 
K’s which are not F are G.
(2)   If F lies along a ‘characteristic dimension’ for K’s, then 
some K’s are F. If K is an artifact or social kind, then F is 
the ‘function or purpose’ of kind K.
(3)   If F is a striking property, then some K’s are F, and all 
other K’s are disposed to be F. If F is not a striking prop-
erty, [and if ‘K’s are F’ is not a minority Type A generic,] 
then almost all K’s are F.Leslie is adamant that these 
clauses do not deliver semantic truth conditions for 
generics. Rather, they are ‘worldly truthmakers’ which 
specify how the world must be in order for the generic 
to be true.
For Leslie, the distinction between semantic truth and worldly 
truthmakers is of the utmost importance. For one thing, she takes 
these truthmakers to be far more complex than the purely semantic 
clauses for generics. If the semantics of generics were as complex as 
these truthmakers, we would not expect children to display com-
petence with generic interpretation and generic truth value judg-
ments until much later in their development. More importantly, 
the distinction between the semantic question of what sentence 
X means and the metaphysical question of what the world must 
be like if sentence X is to be true seems to be rather fundamental.
For example, take the example of what it is to be slimy. Semantic 
questions would include: what does ‘slimy’ mean? What kinds of 
objects are in ‘slimy’’s extension? Metaphysical questions would 
include: what facts about an object make it slimy? Is sliminess a 
property of the world external to our senses? Or is it something 
that only exists if there are creatures which can experience slimi-
ness? Now consider the following sentence:
(10) Binky is slimy.
In providing a semantics for (10), we can punt on the metaphys-
ical questions of whether sliminess is ‘out there’ in the world, or 
somehow a ‘product’ of our experience, or whatever. All we’re inter-
ested in is the sentence’s compositional structure and its truth 
conditions. And these semantic features can be provided rather 
easily, using the standard resources of generative linguistics and 
first-order logic:
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Compositional Structure of (10):
Truth conditions (10) Slimy(Binky)
On the other hand, if we are going to specify the conditions 
which must be in place if (10) is going to be true, we need to choose 
a specific metaphysical view of sliminess. For the sake of argument, 
let’s say that in order for an object to be slimy, that object must 
be experienced as slimy by a normal observer in normal percep-
tual conditions. Call this ‘the dispositional theory of sliminess.’ 
Importantly, this theory says nothing about what ‘slimy’ means, 
but only says something about what it is for an object to actually 
be slimy. Unlike our analysis above, it doesn’t give us the truth-con-
ditions of (10), nor its compositional structure or logical form.
What is important for our purposes is that even if the disposi-
tional theory of sliminess is correct, that would explain nothing 
about how we can be competent with the sentence ‘Binky is slimy.’ 
We can very well understand what the sentence says (once we 
fix a referent for ‘Binky’) without having any metaphysical theory 
of sliminess. If the dispositional theory of sliminess did deliver 
a semantics for ‘slimy,’ the theory would be part of what speak-
ers would have to know in order to know that (10) is true. This 
is already quite implausible, since competent users of the term 
‘slimy’ don’t have to have any particular convictions about the 
metaphysics of sliminess. But to make matters worse, even if the 
metaphysical theory were to enter into the semantics, the logical 
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form – that is, the structure that feeds into compositional semantic 
interpretation – of ‘Binky is slimy’ would be:
The complexity of the clause makes it implausible that a child 
would learn how to interpret sentences structured this way before 
learning the much more simply structured clauses for quantifi-
ers. More importantly, even if this were plausible, and there is a 
compelling argument for incorporating standard conditions and 
observers into the truth-conditions for (10), the formulation above 
delivers the wrong logical form for ‘Binky is slimy.’ The GEN operator 
is needed because the dispositional theory dictates that Binky is 
slimy iff Binky is experienced as slimy across a range of conditions 
including more than one standard observer and more than one 
standard condition. But this is already problematic. ‘Binky is slimy’ 
is a statement of a particular fact about a particular individual, 
and as such, is patently non-generic. Leslie thus concludes that a 
semantic theory that takes us this far away from an empirically ade-
quate account of the logical form and compositional structure of 
generics ought to be abandoned. The question I will pursue in the 
next few sections is whether this demarcation between semantics 
and metaphysics holds up in the case of Type C generics.
2. Introducing type C generics
All Type C generics have two interesting properties. First, Type C 
generics predicate what I call socially perspectival predicates (SPPs) 
of social kinds. Second, they represent social kinds as non-acci-
dentally linked to the properties described by SPPs. We are here 
interested in a subset of Type C generics, namely those concerning 
racial kinds. Generics such as ‘Blacks are criminal/violent/thuggish’ 
and ‘Muslims are terrorists’ encourage racialized interpretations 
insofar as they lead interpreters to ascribe racial or ethnic charac-
teristics to criminality, violence, terrorism, etc.
It is worth dwelling on this second feature of Type C generics, 
since the concept of racialization, native to sociology and political 
science, has received precious little attention within the semantics 
literature proper.. ‘Racialization’ describes the process by which 
GEN x, y [Standard Observer (x) ∧ Standard Condition(y)]
[
Experiences As_In_(x, Binky, slimy, y)
]
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racial or ethnic characteristics are ascribed to people, institutions, 
practices, and relationships within a social structure, frequently 
independently of the self-characterizations of the people, prac-
tices, etc., in question (Omi and Winant 2013).5 Consequently, crime 
is racialized to the extent that Blacks and other non-Whites are per-
ceived to be especially disposed toward criminality,6 and terrorism 
is racialized (or at least indexed toward a specific religion) to the 
extent that Muslims (and especially Arab Muslims) are perceived 
to be paradigmatic examples of ‘terrorists.’
For the purposes of this paper, I largely take for granted that 
such interpretations are readily accessible. Other examples of 
racialized predicates include Ronald Reagan’s infamous rhetoric 
of the harmful self-entitlement wielded by ‘welfare queens,’ a term 
designed to elicit anti-Black and anti-welfare sentiments among 
White voters.7 More recently, writers in and outside academia have 
focused on the possibility that ‘thug’ is a racialized code for an 
intimidating, aggressive Black male.8 In my view, part of the job 
of a perspectival semantics is to explain how these SPPs receive 
these racialized interpretations.
The rest of the paper runs as follows. First, I introduce the central 
motivations of socially perspectival semantics and introduce the 
5While it is not one of his words, perhaps the most wide-ranging and expansive discussion of 
the mechanisms and social effects of racialization is that of Fanon2008).
6A wide variety of disciplines have produced excellent work on the causes and effects of the 
racialization of crime at institutional, interpersonal, and individual levels. relevant facts 
include: an arbitrary Black person is over 7 times as likely to go to prison as an arbitrary 
white person (Alexander 2012), Blacks are about 2.7 times as likely to be subjected to vehicle 
investigative stops as whites (Epp, Maynard-Moody, and Haider-Markel 2014), Black teens are 
about 21 times as likely as Whites to be shot by police (Gabrielson, Jones, and Sagara 2014), 
over 50% of homicide offenders between 1980 and 2008 were Black (The u.S. Department 
of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics 2011), and both explicit 
and implicit psychological associations of Blackness with crime are shared by the majority 
of Americans (Watson, Jones, and robinson-Saunders 1995; Correll et al. 2002; nosek, Banaji, 
and Greenwald 2002, 2007).
7As it turns out, such appeals were effective. See Haney-Lopez (2014) for a book-length discus-
sion of the role of these coded ‘dog whistles’ in American politics. One set of studies (Gilliam 
1999) hypothesized that the term ‘welfare queen’ triggered a racialized cognitive and cultural 
script which held that Blacks (and especially Black women) are indolent and undeserving. The 
studies found that exposure to the ‘welfare queen script’ in visual media increased anti-Black 
bias, support for anti-welfare policies, and support for traditional gender roles.
8See Anderson (‘notorious Thugs’.) Again, this insight is not confined to the academy. The 
popular sports news site Deadspin drew explicit attention to the way in which ‘thug’ con-
ventionally tokens ‘Black’ after African-American professional football player and Stanford 
graduate richard Sherman was widely accused of being a ‘thug’ after a boisterous post-game 
interview: ‘The word “thug” has been used so many times by the same sort of people about 
the same sort of thing that it’s no longer even accurate to call it code – it’s really more of a 
shorthand. It means a Black guy who makes White folks a little more uncomfortable than 
they prefer’ (Wagner 2014).
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notion of a socially perspectival predicate (SPP.) I then show that 
Leslie’s weak semantics for generics and its attendant distinction 
between semantic and metaphysical truth can explain neither (1) 
how SPPs (and a fortiori Type C generics) acquire their truth condi-
tional semantic features nor (2) the underlying semantic structures 
that make default racialized interpretations of these generics plau-
sible. Finally, I provide a sketch of an account that explains both of 
these aspects in the final section of the paper.
2.1. Socially perspectival predicates
According to received wisdom, some of our concepts ‘carve nature 
at its joints.’ Mountains, gold, water, and other mind-independent 
natural kinds are the joints, and the terms or concepts for these 
joints are the knives. We may bring the concepts of ‘mountain’ and 
‘water’ to the world, but those concepts are answerable to how 
mountains and water actually are. The world’s joints are meta-
physically perspective-independent entities, and they are criterial 
for the correctness and applicability of terms/concepts which are 
non-perspectival.
Yet other concepts reflect the perspective of the categorizers, 
and indeed require such perspectives for their intelligibility. This is 
most obvious in the case of concepts for conventionally demarcated 
social kinds such as ‘foreigner.’9 Unlike the set of mountains, which 
always consists of all and only those things which are mountains, the 
set of foreigners can only be assessed from a geopolitical perspec-
tive. I can even ‘experience’ the perspectival nature of ‘foreigner’ by 
going to a foreign country and realizing that I count as the foreigner!
‘Foreigner’ is an example of what I call a socially perspectival 
predicate (SPP.) We can characterize SPPs in terms of four interre-
lated conditions:
Socially perspectival predicates (SPP): Predicate P is socially per-
spectival just in case
(1)   Metaphysical condition: the property or object that P 
picks out is perspective-dependent.
(2)   Semantic condition: The extension of P is determined 
by a contextual parameter for a relevant perspective (RP).
9I borrow the example of ‘foreigner’ from Price 2007.
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(3)   Pragmatic condition: patterned socially sanctioned uses 
of P institute the property or object which P picks out, 
and facts about these properties constrain and direct 
these patterned uses.
(4)   Epistemic condition: there is no social-practice-in-
dependent or non-conventional epistemic standard 
which can be used to determine whether a property 
or object X falls into the extension or anti-extension 
of P. The metaphysical condition entails that the prop-
erties described by SPPs do not exist independently 
of the perspectives of the creatures who apply such 
predicates. Independently of labeling people as ‘thugs,’ 
‘terrorists,’ and ‘criminals,’ there would be no thugs, ter-
rorists, or criminals – though there would be mountains, 
insects, quarks, and shapes, even if these objects were 
never labeled as such by a linguistic community.10
The semantic condition hypothesizes that perspectival terms like 
‘foreigner,’ ‘Black,’ ‘criminal,’ and others contain in their semantics 
a contextual parameter that needs ‘filling’ by a relevant perspec-
tive (RP), in the same way that predicates of personal taste such 
as ‘tasty’ require an experiencer parameter in order to model 
their contribution to truth conditional content (e.g. Glanzberg 
2007).
(11) [[tasty]] = tasty-to-experiencer E
(12) [[foreigner]]= foreigner-for-relevant perspective RP
The pragmatic condition suggests that the dominant patterned 
uses of SPPs are capable of instituting or creating social kinds. My 
account is officially neutral on the mechanisms that permit this 
institution (it can, for instance, accommodate various proposals by 
theorists of social construction), but the basic idea is that there is a 
feedback loop between practices of labeling or describing bits of 
the world and facts about the world external to such practices. In 
such conditions, labeling an object with P creates constraints on 
10I take it that the existence of metaphysically perspective-dependent properties depend on 
the making of actual judgments about these properties, but I do not mean to foreclose the 
possibility that some such properties depend on there being dispositions to detect these 
properties, even if no perspective actually does detect them.
14   P. O’DONNELL
what kinds of things belong in the concept’s extension, and facts 
about these objects mutually constrain the proprieties of use for P.
Finally, the epistemic condition entails that the procedures for 
determining whether or not an object fits into the extension of 
an SPP are set by the judgments, conventions, and practices of a 
linguistic community, not by any convention-independent stand-
ard. In order to find out what sorts of people in a given society 
counted as criminal, thuggish, or a terrorist, we would have to make 
concrete reference to social conventions such as the criminal code 
of that society, norms of etiquette and proper conduct, and the 
overarching political context. If we pair this epistemic thesis with 
the metaphysical, semantic, and pragmatic conditions, we get the 
result that a community’s judgments and practices are authoritative 
over what kinds of objects actually fit into the extension of a given 
SPP. As long as the community has fixed an interpretation of what 
it means to be a ‘criminal,’ it cannot be wrong about who counts as 
criminal.
While there is frequently widespread agreement in a given 
social order about what sorts of things fall under a particular SPP 
and which do not, extensions can also be more-or-less locally con-
tested. Contestations arise when members of a collective disagree 
on certain aspects of the publicly shared criteria for categorizing 
an object or kind with the predicate. Consider terms for human 
races, such as ‘Black’ or ‘White.’ Such terms are applied to different 
people according to a few loose criteria, including somatic char-
acteristics (skin color, hair texture, etc.), prior ancestry, culturally 
specific ‘Black’ vs. ‘White’ experiences, personal racial identification, 
etc. (Mills 1998) More often than not, these criteria conflict when 
we try to categorize a given individual as White or Black (even 
assuming that we are only trying to categorize people of roughly 
European and/or African stock.) Borderline cases such as ‘mixed-
race’ individuals and individuals capable of ‘passing’ as a member 
of another race show that these loose criteria deliver conflicting 
results depending on which aspects of the theory we regard as 
most relevant for any given case. In such cases, we might defer to 
a meta-conventional epistemic standard. For instance, one widely 
endorsed theory of racial membership – the ‘one drop of blood 
rule,’ according to which a certain percentage of ‘Black’ ancestry 
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is sufficient to make one ‘Black’ – frequently settles debate about 
whether a person is White or Black in contexts in which that 
meta-convention is honored.11
As far as I can tell, the category of SPPs does not map neatly onto 
other linguistic categories that philosophers and linguists have stud-
ied.12 However, SPPs seem to have some affinity with predicates of 
personal taste such as ‘tasty,’ ‘delicious,’ ‘spicy,’ ‘disgusting,’ ‘fun,’ and 
‘beautiful.’13 The properties these predicates pick out are metaphysi-
cally perspective-dependent: after all, nothing is tasty, fun, or beauti-
ful unless there is some experiencer to whom things are tasty, fun, or 
beautiful. Moreover, judgments about tastiness are authoritative over 
what kinds of things are tasty, at least to some extent. If you sincerely 
say ‘cheeseburgers are tasty,’ you can’t be wrong about the fact that 
cheeseburgers are tasty to you – in this sense, your judgments about 
‘tasty’ exhaust the scope of what kinds of things are tasty (to you.)
However, here the resemblances between personal taste and 
social perspectives fade. First, what you personally think is tasty or 
fun has no bearing on whether others in the community share your 
tastes: what seems tasty or fun to you might seem disgusting or devi-
ant to your friend, but after all, de gustibus non disputandum. Second, 
it doesn’t seem that the epistemic standards which are used to 
determine whether any given object is tasty are conventional, much 
11One might think that the one-drop-of-blood rule represents a convention-independent 
epistemic standard for ‘Black’ and ‘White,’ since what is being measured are non-perspec-
tive-dependent genetic facts of the matter. This is true, but it misses the point. The one-drop 
rule is a convention-independent epistemic standard which is invoked to justify a very much 
convention-dependent standard with a specific function: to subjugate those identified as 
‘Blacks’ and to privilege those identified as ‘Whites.’ It is simply not the case that the one-
drop rule identifies two different racial groups independently of the activities of humans 
and communities which draw racial distinctions for specific purposes.
For instance, a recent study (Bryc et al. 2015) found that about 13% of Louisiana residents 
who identify as ‘White’ have at least 1 ‘Black’ ancestor over the last 11 generations (or 1% 
African ancestry.) The findings were hotly debated; did this make those white folks ‘Black?’ 
Meanwhile, there was very little discussion about a related topic: the average African-
American has 24% European ancestry, or at least one ‘White’ ancestor over the last 3 or 4 
generations. But no one seemed to wonder whether this made the average African-American 
‘White.’ This would seem to confirm the existence of an implicitly agreed-upon conventional 
standard: one Black ancestor is sufficient to make you Black, but no amount of White ances-
tors is guaranteed to make you White.
12One obvious precursor is Gallie’s (1955–1956) notion of an ‘essentially contested concept.’ 
The present account goes beyond Gallie’s insofar as it attempts to diagnose the seman-
tic, epistemic, and pragmatic mechanisms that lead to such contestation in the first place. 
Moreover, the category of SPPs arguably contains a wider swath of predicates than does 
Gallie’s conception.
13This isn’t to suggest that the category of ‘predicates of personal taste’ is any better defined 
than SPPs. The goal in each case is to take paradigm examples and see how far the linguistic 
data take us.
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less social, in nature. Generally one knows immediately whether one 
is having an experience as of tasty or of something beautiful. One’s 
own sensory apparatus, dispositions, and judgments are sufficient 
for determining whether a given x is tasty-to-one.
Even so, I take it that there are uses of so-called predicates of per-
sonal taste which more closely mirror the characteristics of SPPs.14 
These uses do not report on what an object or experience is like to a 
particular experiencer, but seem to make a claim about how things 
are in the real world, independently of the perspective of any particu-
lar experiencer, but dependent on the perspective of possible generic 
experiencers in the linguistic community. If ‘cool’ can be used in this 
latter sense, I would be saying something false if I utter (13) in a com-
munity in which Beyoncé is widely and generically regarded as cool:
(13) Beyoncé is not cool.
On the other hand, (13) could be true in a context in which I am 
understood to be reporting on my own opinions about Beyoncé. 
This ostensibly dual function of ‘cool’ seems to give us reason to 
think that the first pair of sentences below describes a disagree-
ment, while the second pair does not. Assuming the speaker is 
being truthful, a retraction or clarification of A’s position follow-
ing the first pair of sentences seems entirely natural, but not the 
second pair.
A: Beyoncé is not cool [generically].
B: What are you talking about? Of course she is!
A: Ok, well she’s not cool to me. I have different tastes.
A: Beyoncé is not cool [to me].
B: What are you talking about? Of course she is!
A: ?? you’re right. I lied before.
In the first set, the speaker backs down from the strong claim that 
Beyoncé ‘lacks coolness,’ so to speak, in order to report on her 
personal dispositions about what she finds cool. In the second 
set, the speaker begins with a report on her dispositions, and her 
interlocutor either (1) misunderstands that the speaker is using 
‘cool’ in this private way and challenges her, (2) reports on his own 
dispositions regarding coolness, thus failing to disagree with the 
speaker, or (3) understands that the use is private, but maintains 
14Strictly speaking, I am as yet agnostic on whether this is actually a difference in the use of 
a term, or whether this is evidence for there being more than one lexical entry for some 
predicates of personal taste.
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that the speaker misunderstands what the proper extension of 
‘cool’ is. In all three cases, the speaker’s retraction is infelicitous.15
This suggests that determining what (possibly generic) sets of 
judges regard, treat, or believe to be cool is vital to determining 
what ‘cool’ means in context. This is a point which is generally over-
looked in the generics literature. For instance, Krifka et al. (1995) 
claim that semantic theories must be able to distinguish between 
what generics say about ‘the world’ and what they say about ‘cul-
tural norms’ in order to be viable:
For instance, suppose it is the norm in some culture to assume that 
snakes are slimy. Even in that culture, the sentence snakes are slimy is a 
false sentence – although believed to be true by most members of the 
culture – since snakes, those real-world objects, are in fact not slimy. 
That is, generics are construed about making claims about the world, 
rather than what is considered a cultural norm. (Krifka et al. 1995, 49)
Here the assumption is that the purpose of generics is to describe 
the world as it is independently of our beliefs, judgments, and 
behaviors. While this is true of a wide variety of generics, generics 
which contain SPPs challenge this assumption. Replace ‘snakes are 
slimy’ in the above paragraph with ‘drugs are cool’ and see how it 
stands – ‘the sentence drugs are cool is a false sentence – although 
believed to be true by most members of the culture – since drugs, 
those real-world objects, are in fact not cool.’ The fact that most 
members of a culture believe that snakes are slimy is neither a 
necessary nor sufficient condition for snakes being slimy, but the 
fact that most members of a culture believe that drugs are cool is 
necessary and possibly sufficient for it being the case that drugs 
are cool, at least in the generic sense outlined above.16
However, even this doesn’t go quite far enough. ‘Drugs are cool’ 
isn’t true because most people think it’s true or because they want 
it to be true; rather, it’s true because some relevant authority thinks 
15In the third case, perhaps B’s utterance could lead to a negotiation over which perspective 
on ‘cool’ is the most appropriate one, and perhaps A might eventually retract her statement 
after endorsing B’s conception of ‘cool.’ However, immediate retraction is odd, to say the 
least. (And even when it occurs, this situation can plausibly be read as feigned endorsement 
in order to curry favor with B rather than as a true change of semantic heart.) Thanks to an 
anonymous reviewer for pointing out this third interpretation.
16Another, perhaps more effective example: ‘Cows are food,’ is true if ‘food’ selects the dominant 
culinary-economic context in which cows are treated as things to be consumed, and the 
ability of ‘food’ to select this context is entirely dependent on whether or not cows are treated 
as food by some set of dominant practices. At the same time, ethical vegans and vegetarians 
can, with some justification, argue that the sentence is false at other, less dominant contexts.
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or says so.17 In this sense, the extensions of SPPs can be decided in 
an oligarchical fashion. Krifka et al.’s requirement here is thus ham-
pered all the more by the fact that it seems to rule out an analysis 
of virtually any generic that invokes a social or normative category. 
Part of what it is to belong in the extension of ‘terrorist’ or ‘criminal’ 
is to be treated like a terrorist or criminal in practice, and to be 
believed to be a criminal or terrorist by some relevant authority. 
That is, in applying the predicates ‘criminal,’ ‘terrorist,’ ‘thuggish,’ and 
so on, one needs to have a grasp of a certain relevant perspective 
from which terrorism, criminality, and thuggery are assessed – and 
it is part of the very idea of social perspectivalism that the relevant 
perspective will frequently not be one’s own.
3. Leslie reconsidered
Type C generics pose two problems for Leslie’s account. First, they 
challenge her distinction between semantic truth and metaphys-
ical truth-makers by showing that in a wide range of cases, the 
things that must be the case in order for a generic to be true are 
sometimes the very conditions under which a predicate gets its 
semantic meaning. Those conditions frequently consist of shared 
understandings of what it is to be an X, and it is sometimes impossi-
ble to isolate these understandings from semantic questions about 
what ‘X’ means. Second, the default racialized readings of Type C 
generics cannot be accounted for within Leslie’s weak semantics.
3.1. Contra Leslie 1: perspectives and semantics
Leslie’s reasons for keeping truth conditions separate from worldly 
truthmakers are good ones. Semantic theorizing about what the 
sentences of a natural language mean should be constrained by 
facts about how human beings manage to pull off the trick of 
learning that language in the first place. And if children are able to 
display adult-like competence with using and interpreting gener-
ics even before they show competence with quantifiers, that is 
good evidence for the compositional semantic profile of generics 
being very simple. However, what we have seen is that even if this 
17This ‘externalist’ commitment is important. We’ll see an example of this oligarchical external-
ism when we turn to case of authority relations in baseball in the next subsection.
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profile is simple, the worldly conditions that must hold in order for a 
given generic to be true are quite complex. In fact, they’re too com-
plex – the clauses that have to be built into an analysis of worldly 
truth makers might take us far away from the original compositional 
structure of a sentence (recall our ‘Binky is slimy’ example.)
However, it isn’t clear that the metaphysical/semantic distinc-
tion can be made so quickly. Leslie’s clauses are not only ‘meta-
physical truth-makers,’ they are conditions under which a generic 
is understood. That is, while the clauses may have little to say about 
what the semantic features of generics are, they have a great deal 
to say about the epistemic question of how generics are inter-
preted. Which generics an interpreter judges true will be a function 
of how that interpreter perceives worldly conditions to be. If Leslie 
is right, and generics indeed are a source of evidence for how our 
primitive generalization mechanisms work, then it is plausible to 
think that these generalizations privilege different properties of 
kinds in judging certain generics true. For instance, the following 
generics are true, and the type of facts that seem to make them 
true (to an interpreter) differs in each case:
(14) Turtles are long-lived. (biological endowment)
(15) Dobermans have pointy ears. (artifactual)
(16) Dobermans have floppy ears. (natural/non-artifactual)
(17) Scotsmen wear kilts. (social/cultural tradition)
(18) Prime numbers are divisible by one and themselves. (axiomatic/definitional)
Children and adults alike treat some types of worldly properties 
rather than others as more important to the evaluation of a given 
generic, depending on what specific kinds and ascribed proper-
ties are involved. And if these metaphysical properties have such 
a strong effect on whether a generic is true or false, then that 
seems to be sufficient reason to incorporate metaphysical theories 
of what makes a generic true into the semantics for the generic.18
To this extent, Leslie’s worry about compositionality loses some 
of its bite. Even if it is implausible that children are tiny metaphysi-
cians, fully equipped with dispositional theories of sliminess that 
does not show that children are completely ignorant of what kinds 
of worldly features make it the case that a generic is true. All we 
18Gelman (2003) shows that children are far more likely to produce generics about ‘natural’ kinds 
than ‘artifactual’ kinds. She concludes that children rely on the deliverances of an implicit 
folk metaphysics in evaluating and producing generic claims. Prasada and Dillingham (2006) 
show that adults access different explanations of why a generic is true depending on their 
folk conception of what ontological class objects and kinds belong to.
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need in order to treat the metaphysics as reasonably continuous 
with the semantics is the premise that children rely on their knowl-
edge of the world in interpreting and assessing generic claims,19 
and that they frequently defer to other members of their linguistic 
community in assigning meanings to terms.
The question, then, is what kinds of properties are relevant to 
the interpretation of the Type C generics we are tracking? A great 
deal will hinge on what properties are relevant to the interpreta-
tion of various SPPs. In the remainder of the paper, I motivate the 
claim that in order to make sense of the interpretation of SPPs 
like ‘terrorist,’ ‘criminal,’ and ‘thug,’ we need to allow the seman-
tic dimensions of SPPs to interact with facts about their function 
within particular sets of social practices.
3.2. Proof of concept: baseball
In order to show that SPPs have the type of lexical complexity I am 
supposing they have, we need to show two things. First: that there 
are predicates whose extensions are determined by social, conven-
tional, practice-dependent standards, and that those standards yield 
epistemically authoritative interpretations of the extension of those 
predicates. Second: that in this process of extension-fixing, a meta-
physically response-dependent kind or object is instituted or created.
Let’s start simple. Imagine a game of baseball.20 The game 
is governed by two kinds of rules, constitutive and regulative.21 
19See Prinz (2002) for a thorough defense of the claim that background knowledge can figure 
into semantic interpretation in a way which still obeys the compositionality constraint. I 
must remain agnostic on what counts as metaphysics being ‘reasonably continuous’ with 
semantics for the moment, but if Gelman’s and Prinz’s acquisition stories are workable in the 
case of social kinds, we have good grounds to challenge Leslie’s dichotomy.
20For those unfortunate enough to lack familiarity with the glorious ordered complexity of 
the game of baseball, I can only point to the official baseball rules (MLB Publications 2015). 
However, for the purposes of the example I set up, you only need to know the following: 
a player, known as the ‘pitcher’ throws the ball to his opponent, the ‘batter.’ This throwing 
event is called a ‘pitch.’ Every pitch is either a ‘ball’ or a ‘strike.’ roughly speaking, a ‘strike’ is a 
pitch that the batter swings at or a pitch which crosses home plate and is within the ‘strike 
zone’ – an invisible area extending roughly from the batter’s knees to his chest. Conversely, 
a ‘ball’ is a pitch that the batter does not swing at and which is outside the strike zone. 
(Baseball fans will already note the inadequacy of this characterization, but it should do for 
our purposes.) The pitcher’s objective is to prevent the batter from reaching base, and the 
batter’s objective is to reach base. One way for the pitcher to win this duel is to get three 
strikes past the batter, and one way for the batter to win this duel is to force the pitcher to 
throw four balls.
21The basic contrast between these types of rule has been unpacked in different ways by rawls 
(1955), Searle (1995), Haugeland (1998), and many others.
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Constitutive rules for a game or practice are rules which some-
how ‘constitute’ a given game or practice. The constitutive rules of 
baseball make it the case that baseball games can exist: these rules 
specify what counts as a ball or strike, under what conditions a 
team earns a run, and that if a batted ball is caught, then the batter 
is out, etc. Regulative rules, on the other hand, ‘regulate’ an already 
existing practice: they specify appropriate rules of conduct for the 
players. Thus a batter who strikes out is obliged to leave the field 
and sit in the dugout, and a runner is obliged to run the bases if he 
is to score a run for his team. Obviously, constitutive and regulative 
rules interact. A player who conducts herself appropriately also 
manages to follow the constitutive rules of the game.
The rules of baseball manage to confer semantic contents on 
linguistic performances within the game and also manage to con-
stitute baseball objects. Deciding just which baseball objects they 
are is largely a matter of what perspectives we are prepared to treat 
Figure 1. The Strike Zone. Courtesy of Major League Baseball.
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as authoritative. Let’s take the example of strikes. When is a pitch 
a strike? There are at least three natural interpretations, each of 
which has substantial effects on how the game is played.
Let X be a pitch from pitcher to catcher.
Let Condition S be met just in case X passes through the strike 
zone (Figure 1).
Let U be the home-plate umpire. U’s job is to respond to any 
X with one of two calls: ‘ball!’ or ‘strike!’ Any X that is not a ball is a 
strike, and vice versa.
STRIKE₁: X counts as a STRIKE₁ just in case X meets condition 
S, regardless of whether or not U calls ‘strike!’ U’s call is in a sense 
entirely superfluous.
STRIKE₂: X counts as a STRIKE₂ just in case condition S is satisfied or 
U calls ‘strike!’ U’s calling ‘strike!’ is sufficient for X to count as a STRIKE2, 
but it is not necessary. That is, it is possible for an X which satisfies 
condition S to count as a STRIKE2, even if U does not call ‘strike’!
STRIKE₃: X counts as a STRIKE₃ just in case U calls ‘strike!,’ regard-
less of whether condition S is met. U’s calling ‘strike!’ is necessary 
and sufficient for X to be a STRIKE3.
Each idealized interpretation has different implications for the 
epistemic authority that U’s call bears.22 For instance, if what it is to 
be a strike is to be an X of type STRIKE₁, U can be wrong, even sys-
tematically wrong, about whether any given X ‘really’ is a strike. In 
fact, U’s call is entirely superfluous. Strictly speaking, U doesn’t play 
any special role in conducting the game; the question of whether 
X is a strike could be resolved by appeal to a replay device that 
measured precisely whether or not X satisfied condition S. At the 
other extreme, if what it is to be a strike is to be an X of type STRIKE₃, 
then it is impossible for an umpire to be wrong about whether a 
given X is a strike. His utterance, ‘strike!,’ functions as a performative 
which makes it the case that X is a strike, much in the same way that 
saying ‘I now pronounce you married’ in the right context makes it 
the case that two people are now married. At this extreme, it does 
not even seem as if U is still bound by the constitutive rules: rather, 
he legislates them as he goes along.
We need an intermediate position which does justice to the 
notion that the umpire’s call is answerable to how things stand in 
22This does not mean that it is easy to tell in practice which norm is in play. For instance, some 
things that count as STrIKE
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the world (that is, with the nature of X’s) and to the notion that the 
umpire’s call is authoritative over what those X’s actually are (i.e. 
balls or strikes.) STRIKE₂ is just such a position. According to STRIKE₂, 
an umpire can be wrong or right about whether any given X is a 
strike, depending on which perspective we treat as authoritative. 
Say that an umpire calls an X that does not satisfy condition S. From 
the point of view of the constitutive rules laid out by the official 
rulebook, U is clearly incorrect about whether X was really a strike. 
However, from the point of view of the regulative rules, which spec-
ify how players and umpires are supposed to conduct themselves 
during a baseball game, the umpire’s call is authoritative. As it turns 
out, the regulative rules stipulate that once an umpire makes a 
strike call, that judgment can be neither challenged nor overturned. 
The practice of strike-calling is thus functionally oligarchical in the 
sense noted above – every player on the field and every spectator 
could deny that the umpire’s call was correct, but that wouldn’t 
make the sentence ‘that was a strike!’ any less true.23 In short, in 
baseball, the umpire’s making a mistake in calling X a strike (accord-
ing to the rulebook perspective) is completely compatible with X’s 
being a strike (according to the perspective honored in practice.)
But wait,’ you might say, ‘why assume that the truth value of ‘strike!’ 
can vary with which perspective is treated as relevant? I can see at 
least two ways in which this delivers the wrong result. First, you hav-
en’t given me an independent reason to treat the umpire’s perspec-
tive as semantically relevant. Sure, it’s relevant to the kinematics of 
the game – we can’t proceed unless the umpire makes some call – but 
that’s not sufficient for showing that the umpire’s call is relevant to the 
semantics of ‘strike.’
Second, and relatedly, I think I know what’s going on here. You’re 
assuming that authority over the kinematics of score gives the 
umpire a form of authority that is relevant to the semantics of ‘strike,’ 
but at best, umpires have an epistemically privileged position when 
it comes to calling strikes. Why not assume that the umpire is simply 
getting things wrong when he calls strikes which do not satisfy the 
rulebook notion of strike, full stop? That is, the umpire knows what 
‘strike’ means – it just means what the constitutive rules say – but he 
is frequently mistaken about what kinds of things actually are strikes, 
much in the same way that I can misperceive a cow as a horse, even 
if I’m an expert on cow-identification. In fact, ‘strike’ calls must have 
23Of course, the perspectives of authoritative bodies that outrank the individual umpire – the 
Major League umpire’s union, say, or Major League Baseball – might reverse this valence.
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merely epistemic (and not semantic) significance. After all, umpires 
can only make so many mistakes until they are sanctioned by Major 
League Baseball. It’s hard to see why such sanctions would be appro-
priate if the umpire speaks truly every time he calls a strike.
These are potent worries, and well taken. Indeed, I think that 
this alternative explanation is compatible with my own, and 
may be more acceptable for some semantic purposes (imagine 
the intractability of teaching a computer what a ‘strike’ is if my 
account delivers the One True Semantics!) However, I believe that 
the objections ultimately arise from an insufficient appreciation 
for how social practices among competent human language users 
can confer functional semantic properties on the terms of a lan-
guage. What is a functional semantic property? Haslanger’s (1995, 
2005) illuminating vocabulary of ‘manifest’ and ‘operative’ concepts 
is helpful in understanding the basic idea. For Haslanger, a ‘man-
ifest’ concept is explicit, public, and officially recognized. Applying 
manifest concepts is ultimately a casuistical problem. A candidate 
manifest concept-applier has to appeal to a more or less explicit 
codification in order to subsume a given part of the world under 
a concept. In the context of baseball, then, the manifest concept 
of a ‘strike’ is just what the official rule book says that it is. On the 
other hand, an ‘operative’ concept is more implicit; it is something 
of an ‘unwritten norm’ which is practiced despite its lack of official 
institutionalization. STRIKE₂ best captures the operative notion of a 
strike: while the umpire can be wrong about what a strike is from 
the perspective of the manifest interpretation, he cannot be wrong 
according to the operative interpretation – he makes the call, and 
the game goes on. In this case, it is the functional, operative notion 
that is privileged within the practice of baseball, even though it 
is clear what it is for any X to be a strike from the point of view of 
the manifest concept.24
Second, the objection above does not so much argue for as pre-
suppose that strikes are best thought of as perspective-independent 
24One might well wonder why the operative interpretation of strikehood is not STrIKE₃, accord-
ing to which the ‘strike’ call functions as a performative which makes it the case that a given 
X counts as a strike, just as ‘you are now married,’ expressed in the right kind of circumstance, 
makes it the case that a given X and y are married. The reason that this seems wrong is that 
this would entail that the constitutive rules play no role in constraining what kinds of X’s can 
be strikes: an umpire can be systematically and utterly wrong according to the constitutive 
rules and still not be able to be sanctioned. However, this seems to represent a breakdown 
in baseball normal conditions. Major League Baseball seems to agree: they sanction their 
umpires if they are systematically out of step with what the rulebook specifies.
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entities – that is, that there is a perspective-independent fact of 
the matter about whether or not the ball crossed some part of the 
plate, and thus we should draw a distinction between strike-seem-
ings and actual strikes. However, this misses the point of the exam-
ple: it’s not that there are two notions of ‘strike’ and that one is 
a perspectival notion, it’s that there are (at least) two notions of 
‘strike’ and that both are perspectival. The argument is over which 
of these perspectives we should treat as relevant – the rulebook 
perspective or the umpire perspective? I have argued that the 
umpire perspective is the one which is semantically and epistem-
ically relevant because of features of how baseball actually works 
in practice.
Finally, the fact that a perspective is ‘in play’ does not entail that 
everyone (or indeed anyone!) participating in the baseball game 
consciously adopts this perspective themselves, or knows that 
this is the perspective that is governing some aspect of game.25 
My account makes room for the possibility that even the umpire 
himself is not authoritative over which perspective is in play. In 
fact, the umpire, no doubt, thinks of himself as trafficking in the 
manifest concept – he takes himself to speak from the rulebook 
perspective. An umpire might even admit that he made a mistake 
after the game ends, suggesting that the umpire takes himself 
to be honoring the rulebook perspective, and expresses regret 
at failing to live up to it. However, on the externalist notion of 
perspectival determination we’ve set up, features of how baseball 
is played in non-ideal circumstances trump what baseball practi-
tioners take to be the authoritative perspective. In this sense, the 
umpire perspective is authoritative even when the umpire does not 
recognize it as his own perspective. This possible mismatch between 
acknowledged speaker commitments on the one hand and actual 
speaker commitments on the other is especially important when 
we turn to an investigation of how racialized terms function within 
discursive practices – despite one’s intentions to the contrary, it 
is possible to signal allegiance to a dominant perspective simply 
through the use of a word.26
25Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to this possibility.
26The possibility of such perspectival signaling has been taken quite seriously in recent years. 
Camp (2013), for instance, proposes an intriguing account of how such ‘signaling’ might 
work in the case of slurs.
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3.3. Racial perspectives
What the objection gets right, I think, is that within the kinematics 
of a highly structured social practice like baseball, the choice of 
the perspective that is relevant to determining the semantic and 
metaphysics of ‘strike’/strike is more or less arbitrary. My diagno-
sis is compatible with an alternative account that treats rulebook 
perspectives as authoritative. Arguably, that’s because in baseball, 
nothing much hinges on what perspective we treat as relevant.27 
However, nailing down the perspective which determines the 
functional meanings of our racialized terms matters a great deal 
for racial ontology. Why? Because the functional properties of 
racialized talk very well can play a global role in organizing racial 
populations in a way that is highly consequential, and perhaps 
even dominating and unjust. Here the stakes are much higher, 
and the question of which perspective we treat as semantically 
and ontologically relevant is more important.
For instance, both the theorists and folk of oppressed groups 
have long known that dominant epistemic perspectives can dic-
tate not only what sorts of entities count as persons, but also what 
different classes of people are in a functional sense. Consider even 
non-explicitly racialized terms like ‘personhood,’ ‘citizenship,’ and 
‘equality.’ The famous opening words of the American Declaration 
of Independence, arguably the cornerstone of much of our mani-
fest, official, publicly avowed thinking about human dignity, frame 
these categories as follows:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalien-
able Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness. (Jefferson and Franklin 1776)
On the other hand, Blacks and other groups have long held privi-
leged perspectives on what concepts such as personhood, justice, 
and dignity mean in their practiced, operative sense:
When White people say ‘justice,’ they mean ‘just us.’ (Black American 
folk saying, quoted in Mills 1997)
27Or at least it doesn’t matter in the sense of being highly relevant to ethical and social concerns 
outside the practice of baseball. The choice of baseball perspective of course does matter 
a great deal in the local world of high-stakes baseball contexts (no-hitters, perfect games, 
the World Series, etc.).
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Race was far from irrelevant to [the Enlightenment conception of ] 
personhood; skin color, hair, and facial features were used to catego-
rize people and determine their moral standing … that is the unac-
knowledged dark side of the Enlightenment ideal … All persons are 
equal, but only White men are persons. (Mills 1998)
The lesson generalizes. When we reflect on the manifest uses 
of our concepts, we find that there are a lot of things we know 
about the social world, and a lot of things we agree upon. This 
comprises a rich shared stock of social knowledge. We know that 
anyone can be a criminal or terrorist, given the right circumstances. 
We know that every person in our society is entitled to life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness. However, reflection on the opera-
tive dimensions of SPPs like ‘criminal,’ ‘terrorist,’ and ‘person’ tells 
another story. While anyone can be a criminal, Blacks are more 
criminal than Whites. While all persons are equal, Blacks are less 
equal than Whites.28 While anyone can be a terrorist, the real ter-
rorists are motivated by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam.
Our stock of shared, explicit, ‘manifest’ knowledge has a murky 
underbelly. We implicitly rely on culturally distributed representa-
tions, beliefs, and assumptions that structure our interpretation of 
the social world and shape our social practices, sometimes result-
ing in profoundly unjust social arrangements. Many of these rep-
resentations are racialized, and seep into terms in our language, 
thereby becoming part of the conventional meaning of certain 
terms – ‘thug,’ ‘welfare queen,’ ‘criminal,’ ‘terrorist.’29
A natural question in the vicinity is how such terms come to 
mean what they do, and how we manage to have this implicit 
knowledge. This introduces a number of questions about the 
relationships between relevant perspectives and semantic values. 
What ensures that a given perspective will be the relevant one? 
28In fact, the operative and manifest notions of personhood came into sharp concordance 
during the ‘Three Fifths Compromise’ of 1787, which treated each slave as 3/5ths of a person 
in tallying the total population of a state in order to assign the appropriate number of rep-
resentatives. Southern states thus received more representation than they would have had 
had slaves not been counted. The result was an overrepresentation of slaveholder interests 
in Congress until 1865.
29It is important to note that not all racialized terms are racialized in the same way at all 
contexts, and that identical terms might have different rP values in different contexts. 
For instance, ‘thug’ is frequently used in ‘reappropriative’ contexts in order to specify and 
celebrate positive aspects of Black male identity. (See Anderson, forthcoming) I read such 
cases as instances of social negotiation over what perspective ought to be authoritative and 
honored. (Consider a White person hurling ‘thug’ as an insult at a Black man, and the latter 
taking it as a compliment.)
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Once determined, how do relevant perspectives become author-
itative over the meanings and uses of our terms? How broad is 
this authority, and what determines whether or not a given RP is 
at play within a discursive context? These are difficult and excit-
ing ‘metasemantic’ questions. While I doubt that there is a single 
answer to these questions, and that each calls for case-by-case 
empirical work, I do think that our discussion so far has given us 
some idea of where we should look for answers.
Most centrally, our baseball example suggests that we ought 
to be attuned to the ways in which power and authority function 
within discursive practices. In practices like baseball, which per-
spectives are relevant and authoritative is determined partially by 
the rules of the game (e.g. the rules stipulate that the umpire is the 
authority) and partially by the way that the practice plays out in 
non-ideal circumstances (e.g. the relevant, authoritative perspec-
tive is determined by a combination of the umpire’s perspective 
and the ‘operative’ perspective that is observed in practice by the 
game’s participants.) Things are not so clear in more complicated 
discursive contexts, however, partially because there are seldom 
explicit authority-conferring rules which make clear what perspec-
tive is in play.
Frequently, determining a relevant perspective is neither 
a top-down nor bottom-up process. More often, perspectival 
determination is a ‘loopy’ process in which top-down authorita-
tive mechanisms specify and reinforce the relevant perspective, 
and bottom-up deferential patterns become reflected in large-
scale institutional structures. For instance, the relevant perspec-
tive that determined membership within the political category of 
personhood is not solely the result of the ‘top-down’ legislation that 
explicitly denied political and moral standing to non-Whites and 
non-males, nor is it solely the result of the ‘bottom-up’ individual 
prejudices and material interests of powerful, landowning Whites. 
Rather, each of these forces (and others) played a role in the consti-
tution of a perspective from which the extension of ‘personhood’ 
could be determined. Moreover, the perspective that was so con-
stituted was highly cross-contextual: Blacks were not only non-per-
sons in most legal contexts, but also in most economic, social, and 
political contexts. Once established, the mechanisms that ensure 
that a certain perspective is treated as authoritative in practice 
can cut across a variety of domains. For instance, the mechanisms 
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that underlie a widespread deference to the perspective associ-
ated with ‘thug’ might include cognitive associational mechanisms 
which pair Blackness with violence or criminality, commitment to 
or acceptance of explicitly racialized political discourse, familiarity 
with negative stereotypes disseminated by popular media, and the 
institutional criminalization of Black (male) conduct.
These issues are deserving of much more discussion than 
I have the space to give them here. Assuming that a satisfying 
metasemantic and empirical story can be told about the various 
mechanisms that determine the nature and authority of relevant 
perspectives, we turn our attention to how the semantic mecha-
nisms we have posited make racialized interpretations possible.
3.4. Contra Leslie 2: racialized interpretations and weak 
semantics
We’ve already seen that Leslie precludes the possibility of incor-
porating authoritative perspectives – an RP parameter – into the 
semantics for Type C generics and SPPs. The notion of racialized 
predicates gives Leslie’s weak semantics a test: if her account can 
successfully account for the interpretation of racialized SPPs, then 
it becomes less clear that SPPs require an RP parameter. However, 
I contend that her semantics fails this test for the same reasons 
as before: in treating semantic truth and metaphysical truth as 
isolated from one another, Leslie’s weak semantics cannot give 
an adequate account of either the meaning or metaphysical truth 
makers of Type C generics with racialized SPPs.
To see this, let’s revisit Leslie’s weak semantics for Type B generics, 
which is organized around the following ‘striking property clause.’30
Striking Property Clause: If F is a striking property, then some 
K’s are F, and all other K’s are disposed to be F. If F is not a striking 
property, [and if ‘K’s are F’ is not a minority Type A generic,] then 
almost all K’s are F.
30One might think that Leslie accounts for these readings via her ‘social kind’ clause: ‘if K is a 
social kind, then F is the function or purpose of the kind K.’ However, I think it implausible, 
to say the least, that criminality or terrorism are primarily conceived as (much less actu-
ally are) the function or purpose of blacks and Muslims. If such things were thought to be 
functions or purposes of these populations, for instance, it would be difficult to fault such 
kinds for performing those functions (although one would still be able to argue that those 
functions are bad.) In any case, there is evidence (Prasada and Dillingham 2006) that social 
kind generics are not normally given this teleological interpretation.
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Type B generics thus admit of the following paraphrase:
(19) Mosquitoes carry West nile.
(19a) Some mosquitoes carry West nile, and all are disposed to carry West nile.
Yet such paraphrases do not adequately capture the nature 
of the relationship that obtains between kinds and predicates in 
some Type C generics. Consider:
(20) Blacks are criminal.
(20a) Some Blacks are criminal, and all Blacks are disposed to be criminal.
(21) Muslims are terrorists.
(21a) Some Muslims are terrorists, and all Muslims are disposed to be terrorists.
If racialized interpretations are as accessible as I have suggested, 
these paraphrases are far too weak, regardless of whether they are 
supposed to be ‘semantic’ or ‘metaphysical’ clauses. Assume that 
they are metaphysical truth-makers. Thus the ‘some’ paraphrase is 
supposed to specify what the world must be like if an interpreter 
is to judge the generic true. Yet this would not explain why (20) 
and (21) seem to exert some inductive or cognitive ‘pull’ on many 
interpreters while (22) and (23) do not seem to exert such a pull.31
(22) Some lawyers are criminal, and all lawyers are disposed to be criminal.
(23) Some Swiss people are terrorists, and all Swiss people are disposed to be terrorists.
The cognitive ‘pull’ in question is that interpreters are likely to 
rely on representations of Blacks as criminal and Muslims as ter-
rorists even despite few to no negative experiences with blacks 
or Muslims. The majority of Americans grossly overestimate the 
objective share of crimes committed by Blacks (Blow 2014), as well 
as the share of terrorist activity committed by Muslims (Ahmed 
2015), and there is evidence that interpreters only need very scant 
evidence for Black criminality or Muslim terrorism in order to tac-
itly endorse a generalization to the effect that ‘Blacks are criminal’ 
or ‘Muslims are terrorists’ (Leslie forthcoming) That is, Blacks and 
Muslims are perceived to be more disposed toward criminality and 
terrorism than, say, lawyers and Swiss people.
However, the paraphrases do not explain why the bar for accept-
ing ‘Blacks are criminal’ is so low, and why the bar for accepting 
‘lawyers are criminal’ is so high. After all, the objective prevalence 
31Leslie forthcoming has argued convincingly that generics like ‘Blacks are criminal’ and 
‘Muslims are terrorists’ are structurally similar to Type B generics, at least in their psycholog-
ical function (that is, these generics are closely linked to essentializing, stereotyping, and 
prejudicial attitudes.) So while I disagree with Leslie’s semantic account in the case of Type 
C generics, I am happy to treat Type C and Type B generics as very closely related in their 
respective psychological functions.
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of crime among lawyers is comparable (and perhaps greater) than 
the prevalence of crime among Blacks, but presumably crime 
among Blacks is given the greater weight. Of course, Leslie might 
argue that her metaphysical truthmakers simply specify minimal 
necessary conditions which must be met in order for the generic to 
be judged true, and that specifying any interpreter biases are not 
the job of her conditions. While I agree that these conditions are 
intended to be ‘minimal’ in this sense, I disagree that there can be 
any minimal specification of what the world must be like when it 
comes to the SPPs we’re targeting, and especially when those pred-
icates interact with racial kinds. That is, the question of who counts 
as a ‘terrorist’ cannot be delivered in any perspective-neutral fash-
ion, and which perspective we choose will already come along 
with certain standards for who or what counts as one. Moreover, 
I take it that the facts about who counts as a terrorist (from some 
relevant perspective) is a feature of the world which is relevant for 
fixing the conditions under which a Type C generic is interpreted, 
and consequently should be part of Leslie’s clauses. So, as I have 
said above, Leslie’s demarcation is due to an inadequate division 
of labor between what the truth conditions of a sentence are and 
what the world must be like in order for the sentence to be true. ‘Blacks 
are criminal’ isn’t judged true because ‘some Blacks’ are criminal; 
rather, it is judged true because its interpretation (and perceived 
truth-conditions) is sensitive to what it means to be a criminal 
given a set of ostensibly ‘normal’ racialized social conditions.
On the other hand, if (contrary to Leslie’s intentions) these 
paraphrases give the truth conditions of generics, notice that the 
‘some’ paraphrase remains true under virtually any substitution 
of a social kind; as long as one member of the kind has the prop-
erty ascribed, the sentence is true. The paraphrases thus obscure 
the sense in which some generics receive default essentialized or 
racialized interpretations, thereby losing the sense in which being 
criminal or being a terrorist is perceived to be proper to certain 
kinds rather than others.
4. Doing better: a semantics for ‘criminal’
So what kind of semantic machinery do we need to capture 
the racialized reading of Type C generics? In this final section, I 
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sketch the beginnings of an answer by focusing on the example 
of ‘criminal.’32
Luckily, the semantics literature already has a good deal to 
say about adjectives like criminal. Criminal belongs to the class 
of gradable adjectives, which includes words like tall, short, and 
smart.33 Gradable adjectives can be paired with degree modifiers 
like more, very, somewhat, kind of, etc.:
(24) Tim is very tall.
(25) Alicia is kind of smart.
(26) Murdering someone is more criminal than stealing.
According to one orthodox analysis (Glanzberg 2007; Kennedy 
2007), gradable adjectives map the objects that they apply to 
onto scales relevant to the given gradable. So, for instance, ‘tall’ in 
(24), when modified by ‘very,’ maps Tim onto the ‘upper end’ of the 
scale for height, whereas ‘smart’ in (25), when modified by ‘kind of’ 
maps Alicia onto the more-or-less ‘middle range’ for intelligence.
Strictly speaking, a scale (S) is a triple consisting of three ele-
ments: degrees (δ₁ … δₓ), a total ordering of those degrees (O), and 
a dimension (D).
More precisely, then, the meaning of a gradable adjective is a 
function from individuals to degrees of the scale. Degrees can be 
thought of as the degree to which a given object is tall, smart, crim-
inal, or whatever. The dimension provides ‘a property according 
to which the degrees are ordered’ (Glanzberg 2007). ‘Tall’ will thus 
be associated with a dimension that provides height, ‘expensive’ 
will be associated with a dimension that provides cost, etc. Finally, 
the dimension orders the degrees (δ1 … δn) totally, meaning that 
relations between degrees on the scale respect antisymmetry, 
transitivity, and totality.34
32Obviously different treatments will be needed for different predicates. For instance, noun SPPs 
like ‘terrorist’ clearly won’t be amenable to the approach to gradable adjectives I recommend 
here. However, the goal in each case will be the same: to show that the rP parameter makes 
a systematic contribution to the default interpretations of Type C generics and to their truth 
conditions. In other work, for instance, I am investigating the possibility that count nouns like 
‘thug’ and ‘terrorist’ are inherent generics (Chierchia 1995) which contain an rP parameter 
in their semantic gloss.
33I have encountered resistance to the idea that ‘criminal’ is truly a gradable adjective in addition 
to being a count noun. If you share these reservations, the term ‘violent’ will do just as well.
S = ⟨훿 … 훿n,O훿1… 훿n,D⟩
34(a) Antisymmetry: If δ₁ ≤ δ₂ and δ₂ ≤ δ₁, then δ₁ = δ₂.
(b) Transitivity: If δ₁ ≤ δ₂ and δ₂ ≤ δ₃, then δ₁ ≤ δ₃.
(c) Totality: Either δ₁ ≤ δ₂ or δ₂ ≤ δ₁.
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The comparative form of gradable adjectives (e.g. ‘taller,’ ‘more 
criminal,’ ‘smarter,’ etc.) can thus be represented as a function which 
maps an individual object or kind onto some degree of tallness, 
criminality, or intelligence that is greater than the degree of tall-
ness, criminality, or intelligence possessed by some other individ-
ual or kind:
(27) (a) Tim is taller than Alicia.
(b) The degree of height of Tim is tall is greater than the degree of height of 
Alicia.
(c) height(Tim) > height(Alicia)
In the absence of an explicit comparison class (i.e. in a sentence 
like ‘Tim is tall’), the meaning of the positive form of a gradable 
adjective is a function from individuals to some degree that 
exceeds some contextually determined standard for height, s(height):
(28) (a) Tim is tall.
(b) height(Tim) > s(height)
What determines whether or not Tim exceeds the standard 
for height? According to this orthodox analysis, the conventional 
meaning of the adjective plays an important role in determining 
this. Roughly, according to the analysis in (28b):
Here s is a contextually determined function which picks out a con-
textually significant degree, based on the interpretation of a given 
gradable adjective … [The] function s returns a contextually signifi-
cant degree of tallness for input tall. The degree d is the value of s in 
context c. I shall refer to this degree value … as the standard for that 
adjective and context (Glanzberg 2007: 9).
To be ‘criminal’ is to be located on a certain scale for criminality 
in a way that exceeds whatever the relevant standard for crim-
inality is in a given context. Yet there are still several different 
ways ‘criminal’ can be interpreted, just as there are several ways 
‘strike’ can be interpreted. Luckily, we can illuminate some of these 
interpretations if we revisit the hypothesis that SPPs contain an RP 
parameter which determines what objects fit into the extension 
or anti-extension of these terms.
If my hypothesis is on the right track, ‘criminal’ contributes a 
parameter which selects a relevant perspective (RP). As we saw, the 
reason that an RP belongs in the semantics is that SPPs describe 
perspective-dependent properties: in order for anything to count 
as a criminal, there needs to be some perspective from which a 
given person is judged to be criminal. In other words, one is only 
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a criminal for some code, social structure, or judicial system.35 
Moreover, as we saw in the case of ‘cool,’ RP can select collective 
or generic perspectives. Which sets of perspectives are actually 
selected will depend on features of the racialized social structure 
in which the term is current.36 The meaning of ‘criminal’ in context 
thus receives the following analysis:
(29)  [[criminal]]c = degree-criminality-for-rP
Once we introduce the RP parameter, we have arrived at one 
possible take on the truth conditions for ‘Blacks are criminal.’
(30) (a) Blacks are criminal.6
(b) The degree of criminality possessed by Blacks as a kind according to a 
relevant perspective is greater than the standard degree of criminality 
according to that perspective.
(c) GEn criminalRP(Blacks) > s(criminalRP)
Again, in providing these truth conditions, we have not yet 
specified the particular perspective which ‘criminal’ picks out. In 
the contexts we’re interested in, those perspectives are selected 
by facts about racialized social structure, just as baseball perspec-
tives are selected by facts about how baseball is conducted (see 
note 29.)
This semantics makes clear that RPs play a role both in deter-
mining the extension of SPPs and in determining the standard in 
virtue of which the properties they describe are associated with 
race. I have suggested that ‘criminal’ is scale invariant – the scale 
for criminality does not change depending on what social group 
‘criminal’ is predicated of. In order to capture the racialized reading, 
I hypothesize that the degree value for ‘criminal’ required for ‘Blacks 
are criminal’ to be true is lower than the degree value required for 
‘lawyers are criminal’ to be true. Blacks tend to be mapped to the 
upper end of the scale by default.
35One source of linguistic evidence that an rP parameter belongs in the semantics is that ‘crim-
inal’ and ‘terrorist’ can be complemented by to/for/according to adjuncts, as in ‘Osama bin 
Laden was a terrorist according to everyone in the united States [but was a freedom-fighter 
according to others]’ or ‘Pot-smokers are criminal to Turkish police, but not not to Dutch 
police.’
36The question of what features these turn out to be is a question for what philosophers and linguists 
sometimes call ‘metasemantics.’ Figuring out why SPPs mean what they do introduces questions 
about the mechanisms by which ‘criminal’ has come to be symbolically connected with Blackness 
in America. The semantic approach I offer here is compatible with many such mechanisms.
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Of course, this is not the only way to capture the racialized 
reading.37 For instance, there could be semantic treatments which 
allow the scale associated with ‘criminal’ to vary. Words like ‘beau-
tiful’ and ‘tasty’ can be associated with different scales. A painting 
might be beautiful according to a scale for colorful or according to 
a scale for austerity, and a beer can be tasty according to a scale for 
darkness, refreshingness, bitterness, etc. In the same way, it might 
be the case that sentences like ‘Blacks are criminal’ or ‘lawyers are 
criminal’ select different scales for criminality. For instance, perhaps 
‘criminal’ selects violent crime or drug crime when it is predicated 
of blacks, and ‘tax fraud’ or ‘white collar crime’ when predicated 
of Whites.38
5. Conclusion
This paper has made a case for the viability of a socially perspectival 
semantic framework for generics involving SPPs. I have provided 
two respects in which Leslie’s taxonomy of generics is unable to 
account for the interesting semantic features of this class, and moti-
vated my own positive proposal about how psychological, social, 
and semantic mechanisms can interact in a way that delivers inform-
ative truth conditions for Type C generics. I hope to have shown 
that a socially perspectival semantics for generics can be extended 
to other semantic problems within philosophy and linguistics, and 
that semantics has important analytical tools to offer to sociology, 
political science, and various approaches to race and racism – and 
that cross-pollination among these disciplines is even more fruitful.
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